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THE FORMATION OF A UNILATERAL CONTRACT
The important distinctions between unilateral and bilateral contracts
are slowly coming to be recognized. The case of Brackenbury V.Hodgkin (1917, Me.) 1O2 Atl. io6 affords an excellent opportunityfor setting forth some of these distinctions.' The exact words usedby the parties are not given in the opinion, but the facts are reportedby the court substantially as follows: The defendant wrote a letter to,her son-in-law, the plaintiff, offering that if he would move from
Missouri to Maine and would care for the defendant during her life,he should have the ownership of the home place after the defend-
ant's death and the use of it during her life. The plaintiff moved as
requested and cared for the defendant for a few weeks. Trouble
ensued, caused, as the court finds, by the unreasonable demands andbad disposition of the defendant, whereupon she conveyed the premises
'Two other recent cases of unilateral contracts, involving the problem of
Shadwell v. Shadwell (i86o) 9 C. B. N. S. i59, are discussed at length in this
number in an article at page 362.
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THE FORMATION OF A UNILATERAL CONTRACT
The important distinctions between unilateral and bilateral contracts
are slowly coming to be recognized. The case of Brackenbury 7/.
Hodgkin (1917, Me.) 102 At!. 106 affords an excellent opportunity
for setting forth some of these distinctions.1 The exact words used
by the parties are not given in the opinion, but the facts are reported
by the court substantially as follows: The defendant wrote a letter to
her son-in-law, the plaintiff, offering that if he would move fro
Missouri to Maine and would care for the defendant during her life,.
he should have the ownership of the home place after the defend-
ant's death and the use of it during her life. The plaintiff moved as
requested and cared for the defendant for a few weeks. Trouble
ensued, caused, as the court finds, by the unreasonable demands and
bad disposition of the defendant, whereupon she conveyed the premises
1 Two other recent cases of unilateral contracts, involving t4e problem of
Shadwell'lJ. Shadwell (1860) 9 C. B. N. S. 159, are discussed at length in this
number in an article at page 362.
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to her son-a co-defendant. The plaintiff filed a bill in equity to
compel a reconveyance from the son to his mother, to restrain the
prosecution of a statutory ejectment suit brought by the son, and to
obtain a decree that the mother should hold the land in trust for the
plaintiff. The relief asked was granted in full.
The court says: "The offer was the basis, not of a bilateral con-
tract, requiring a reciprocal promise, a promise for a promise, but
of a unilateral contract requiring an act for a promise. . . . The
plaintiff here accepted the offer by moving from Missouri to the
mother's farm in Lewiston and entering upon the performance of the
specified acts .... The existence of a completed and valid contract
is clear."
In this case the defendant was the offeror, and by her letter she
created in the plaintiff the power to form a contract between them by
accepting.2 What was this power and how was it to be exercised?
The defendant has clearly offered to undertake the duty of allowing
the plaintiff to enjoy the use of certain lands during her life and of
conveying to him the fee therein at her death. Did she in return
ask the plaintiff to promise to support her until her death? No such
promise was asked for in express terms, nor was such a promise
expressly made. Nevertheless, it would not be unreasonable to find
an implication of such a promise both in the offer and in the acceptance.
In such case, the contract would be bilateral, for each of the parties
would be undertaking to perform certain acts in the future. The
contract would include mutual rights and mutual duties. The act of
the plaintiff in moving to Maine might have been understood by both
parties as an expression of an intention to undertake the duty of
supporting the defendant during her life; that is, this act would be a
promissory act. If such was the fact, the decision is justifiable; for
the contract was fully completed,--the requested promissory accept-
ance had been given, and the offeror had knowledge of it.
The court expressly holds, however, that the contract was unilateral.
This means that the plaintiff was requested to make no promise, either
by words or by other action. He undertook no duty for breach of
which he would be bound to pay damages. He could have abandoned
the place in Maine and ceased to support the defendant, without
committing any breach of contract. Does it not follow from this
that the defendant was not bound, either, and still had the power and
privilege of revoking her offer?
Suppose the words of the defendant were as follows: "I promise
to convey my land to you in return for your moving to Maine and
caring for me during my life." Such words as these indicate that the
'For a discussion of the whole subject of the formation of contract from the
present writer's point of view, see Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and
Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YA.E LAw JouRxAL, i69.
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power of the offeree can be exercised only by a long series of acts
extending through the entire life of the defendant. Acceptance would
not be complete, and the contract would not be formed, until the
instant of the defendant's death.8 Could not the defendant, therefore,
at any time prior to her death and prior to complete acceptance, revoke
her offer by giving notice to the plaintiff? In general, an offer is
supposed to be revocable prior to acceptance. The present case indi-
cates how very inequitable such a revocation might be.4 A quasi-
contractual adtion for quantum meruit would not do justice; for the
defendant has received only a few weeks' support; and to recover
the value of this would not compensate the plaintiff for breaking up
his home in Missouri and moving to Maine. In many cases, a very
simple remedy would be to hold that the plaintiff's power of accept-
ance is irrevocable after the plaintiff has done some substantial act in
part performance of the requested acceptance. In the present case,
however, the plaintiff is deprived of the physical power to accept, even
though he may still have the legal power. Readiness to support is
not the same as actual support and is not the specified acceptance. 5
Perhaps, the chief criticism of the suggested rule of irrevocability is
that it operates with too great severity against the offeror.
There is a third possible assumption in the present case. Suppose
the defendant said: "I promise to convey my land to you in return
for your moving to Maine, and on condition that you support me dur-
ing my life." This, too, is an offer of a unilateral contract. The agreed
equivalent for the defendant's promise is the plaintiff's action in
'It might be questioned whether in such a case the formation of a contract is
possible, for the reason that death would revoke the offer. Surely, however, no
court would give weight to such a suggestion. Even if the offer is revocable
(and it probably is not), the acceptance is complete, and the revocation by death
does not take effect prior to the completion of the acceptance. If it be true
that two living persons are necessary to make a contract, in this case there were
two living persons during the entire period of formation. To adopt the opposite
view would be worse than medieval casuistry.
'It has been vigorously denied that the revocation is inequitable and as firmly
asserted that no offer can be irrevocable. See I. Maurice Wormser, The True
Conception of Unilateral Contracts (Ig16) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 136, follow-
ing Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts (i88o) secs. 4, 178. In support
of the text above, see the article cited in note 2, supra.5 It appears to be the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in DeCicco
v. Schweizer (1917, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 8o7, that the requested act must be
completed before a contract results. "Until marriage occurred the defendant
was not bound. It would not have been enough that the count remained willing
to marry." Similarly, a part performance with readiness to complete was
held insufficient in Pain v. Bastwick (I62I) Cro. Jac. 583. Yet in the present
case the court seems to think it enough that the plaintiff "remained willing" to
support the defendant during her life.
' Such severity could be avoided as suggested in 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, pp.
195, 196.
HeinOnline -- 27 Yale L.J. 384 1917-1918
YAL LA JO NA
power of the offeree can be exercised only by a long series of acts
extending through the entire life of the defendant. Ac eptance would
not be complete, and the contract would not be fonned, until the
instant of the defendant's death.S Could not the defendant, therefore,
at any time prior to her death and prior to co plete acceptance, revoke
her offer by giving notke to the plaintiff? In general, an offer is
supposed to be revocable prior to acceptance. The present case indi-
cates how very inequitable such a revocation ight be.4 A quasi-
contractual action for quantum emit would not do justi ; for the
defendant has received only a few weeks' support; and t reco r
the' value of this would not compensate the plaintiff f r brea i up
his home in Missouri and moving to aine. In any cases, a ver
simple remedy would be to hold that the plaintiff's er of a t-
ance is irrevocable after the plaintiff has done so e substantial a t i
part perfonnance of the requested acceptance. I t e r s t cas ,
however, the plaintiff is deprived of the physical po er to acce t,
though he may still have the legal power. Readiness to s rt i
not the same as actual support and is not the specified acce ta ce.5
Perhaps, the chief criticism of the suggested rule of irrevocability i
that it operates with too great severity against the offeror.6
There is a third possible assumption in the present case. se
the defendant said: "I promise to convey y land to you i r t rn
for your moving to aine, and on condition that you s rt r-
ing my life." This, too, is an offer of a unilateral contract. he agreed
equivalent for the defendant's pro ise is t e l i tiff's ti
a It might be questioned whether in such a case the for ation of a contract is
possible, for the reason that death would revoke the offer. rel , r,
court would give weight to such a suggestion. Even if the offer is revocable
(and it probably is not), the acceptance is co plete, and the revocation t
does not take effect prior to the completion of the acceptance. If it e tr
that two living persons are necessary to make a contract, in this case there ere
two living persons' during the entire period of for ation. To adopt t e site
view would be worse than medireval casuistry.
4 It has been vigorously denied that the revocation is inequitable and as fir ly
asserted that no offer can be irrevocable. See 1. aurice or ser, he r e
Conception of Unilateral Contracts (1916) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 136, follo -
ing Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts (1880) sees. 4, 178. I s ort
of the text above, see the article cited in note 2, supra.
"It appears to be the opinion of the Ne,w York Court of ppeals in e icco
'lI. Schweizer (1917, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 807, that the request~d act ust be
completed before a contract results. "Until marriage occurred the defendant
was not bound. It would not have been enough that the count re ained illing
to marry." Similarly, a part performance with readiness to complete as
held insufficient in Pain 'lI. Bastwick (1621) Cro. Jac. 583. Yet in the present
case the court seems to think it enough that the plaintiff "re ained illing" to
support the defendant during her life.
"Such severity could be avoided as suggested in 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, pp.
195,1g6.
COMMENTS
moving to Maine.7 The support of the defendant during her life is
a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to an immediate con-
veyance. The supposed "contract" is formed upon the plaintiff's
arrival in Maine, and thereafter it is too late for the defendant to
revoke her offer. It is probable that this was the view that was
actually held by the court. In this view the acts of moving to Maine
operate to create new legal relations called contract. These relations
would include the right not to be disturbed in possession of the home
place, the privilege of occupying that place, and the legal power to
create a right to the fee by supporting the defendant during her life.
These relations were all irrevocable by the defendant. As a correla-
tive to the plaintiff's conditional right to the fee, there would be the
conditional duty of the defendant to cause such acts to be done as
will convey the fee. The acts of the plaintiff in supporting the
defendant for life are facts subsequent to the formation of the con-
tract (the preceding relations), and precedent to the plaintiff's right
to an immediate conveyance of the fee.
In cases of this sort, the parties may not be at all clear in their
own minds as to the legal relations that they desire to create; and
the court must determine the legal relations, not because the parties
clearly assented to them but because they willed to do certain acts
that ought to result in such legal relations." If the court holds that
the legal relations are as above, the remedy in the present case was
a proper one. The decree is one for specific reparation and specific
performance. The defendant is ordered not to disturb the plaintiff's
possession; also to hold the fee in trust for the plaintiff. Whether
or not the plaintiff will ever be entitled to a conveyance of the fee is
a question yet to be determined. His right to such a conveyance is
conditional upon support of the defendant during the rest of her life.
It does not seem probable that the plaintiff will be able to fulfil this
condition after the litigation and ill-will between him and the defend-
ant. Of course, it will be the defendant who is causing the non-
fulfillment of this condition; but a court of equity would hardly
compel her to continue to live with the plaintiff. She has perhaps
promised by implication that she would not prevent the plaintiff from
fulfilling the conditions; but even if her conduct is a breach of this
'In this case, also, the problem just discussed above is involved; for the
defendant might telegraph her revocation after the plaintiff had sold his home
and started for Maine. If the defendant had sent such a telegram the court
would no doubt have pushed the moment of acceptance still further back In
Martilt v. Mdes (190) 179 Mass. 114, 6o N. E. 397 Mr. Justice Holmes said: "If
necessary, we should assume that the first substantial act done by the committee
was all that was required in the way of acts to found the defendant's obligation."
'Perhaps this is a further step in the development away from contract back
to status. Cf. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts (917) 27 YALE
LAw JoURNAl, 34.
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implied promise or is tortious, it does not follow that the plaintiff
should get the entire compensation without rendering any of the
service. This is a separate problem. It may be, however, that the
present decree will eventually result in the plaintiff's obtaining the
fee, on the theory of constructive service and on the ground that
the defendant has waived the condition by preventing its fulfillment.
A. L. C.
cGOING VALUE" FOR PURPOSES OF RATE REGULATION
A recent California case raises in an interesting form the much
disputed question, when or to what extent "going value" is value
upon which a public utility is entitled to base its rates. San foaquin
Light & Power Corp. v. Railroad Commission (1917, Cal.) 165 Pac.
i6. It is generally admitted that "going value" is, to some extent
at least, an item of value for rate purposes,1 but there is much
confusion with respect to the questions when and to what extent it
constitutes such value.2 In the latest ruling on the subject by the
United States Supreme Court' it was held that "going value" is "a
property right and should be considered in determining the value of
the property upon which the owner has a right to make a fair return."
This holding, it seemed at first, had practically settled the whole
conflict; for, inasmuch as the Supreme Court is, under the Constitu-
tion, the court of last resort upon the question of valuation for rate-
making purposes,4 it was to be supposed that other tribunals would
follow the Supreme Court upon this question. On the contrary, how-
ever, there has been a tendency on the part of many authorities to
construe away the apparent effect of the Supreme Court's decision.
A striking illustration of this tendency is the California case above
cited. In that case the court affirmed the decision of a commission5
in which, it seems, no. allowance whatever was made for "going
. 'Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines (1915) 238 U. S.',53; People v.
Wilcox (1914) 21o N. Y. 479, 1O4 N. E. g91; Public Service Gas Co. v. Board
of Commissioners (1913, Sup: Ct) 89 N. J. L. 463, 87 At. 651. See Beale &
Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation (2d ed.) secs. 276, 28o.
'Hermann v. Newtown Gas Co. (1916, N. Y. P. S. C., Ist Dist) P. U.R. 1916 D,
825; People v. Wilcox, supra; Rich v. Biddeford, etc. Co. (1917, Me. P. U. C.)
P. U. R. 1917 C, 982; Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Commission (1913)
154 Wis. x2I, 142 N. W. 476; Re Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. (1916, W. Va.
P. S. C.) P. U. R., 1917 A, 577; East Bakersfield, etc. Association v. San Joaquin
etc. Corporation (1916, Cal. R. C.) P. U. R. 1916 C, 380 (the principal case
before the Commission); and numerous other cases. See Whitten, Valuation
of Public Service Corporations, sees. 55o-644.
. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra.
4Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Commissioners, supra.
'East Bakersfield, etc. Association v. San Joaquin, etc. Corporation, supra.
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